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Abstract
We give a formal semantics for a highly expressive language for representing temporal
relationships and events. This language, which we call Versatile Event Logic (VEL), provides a
general temporal ontology and semantics encompassing many other representations. The system
incorporates a number of features that have not been widely employed in AI formalisms. It has the
ability to describe alternative histories using a modal operator. It provides a semantics for individuals
that explicitly models their identity through time and across alternative possible histories; and enables
one to distinguish between necessary and extensional identity of individuals. In virtue of its treatment
of individuals and count nouns, the formalism offers a solution to certain puzzles of identity, which
arise when individuals are described in different ways. We propose that VEL can be used as a
foundational interlingua for comparing and interfacing different AI languages and illustrate this by
considering how Situation Calculus and Event Calculus can be represented within VEL.
 2003 Published by Elsevier B.V.
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1. Introduction
Many researchers in the field of AI have recognised the need for formal representation
languages capable of expressing high-level information in a naturalistic form—e.g., [11,
29]. Of central importance to such a representation is a precise analysis of the semantics
of actions, events and temporal relations. Among the most influential of the large number
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of formalisms proposed to deal with these are: the Situation Calculus [35], Allen’s theory
of action and time [2] and the Event Calculus [32,45]. Philosophers have also examined
various logical aspects of events and we aim to take into account in particular the analyses
given by Davidson [9] and Galton [16]. We present a unifying language that we call Ver-
satile Event Logic (VEL), embodying a range of insights into the logic of time and events.
Representations of time within formal languages can be readily divided into three main
approaches:
• Explicit reference to time points and a temporal ordering relation.
• Explicit reference to temporal intervals and the temporal relationships between them
(which implicitly constrain the ordering of the end-points of the intervals).
• Use of propositional tenses to convey temporal relationships among facts (without
explicit reference to any temporal entities).
Whereas most temporal logics incorporate only one of these ways of referring to temporal
structure, in our formalism all three of them happily coexist. A single VEL formula
can contain time-point and interval variables as well as tenses (though it turns out,
unsurprisingly, that all of these constructs are in fact reducible to logically equivalent
expressions involving just time points and the temporal ordering relation).
Our formalism incorporates each of the following analyses:
Events as transitions. A view of events that can be found in some of the earliest AI
systems is that an event is a transition between states. This idea is the basis of STRIPS [15]
and also the Situation Calculus [35]. The transition account of events can be handled very
nicely within the general framework of modal logics, where a class of state transitions can
be regarded as an accessibility relation. This idea has been used to provide the semantics
for dynamic logic [26].
Events as occurrences over intervals. An approach widely adopted in AI is to correlate
events with the time intervals over which they occur [2,18,20]. This is done by means of
a quasi-logical predicate Occurs(e, δ), which says that an event of type e occurs during
the interval δ. Temporal relationships between events can then be described in terms of
relations between the intervals over which they occur; and in particular by the 13 interval
relations of Allen [1].
Davidson’s existential analysis. Davidson [9] gave an analysis of events according to
which every action verb is associated with an implicit existentially quantified event-token
variable. For example the sentence ‘John saw Mary in London on Tuesday’ would have the
logical form
∃ε[Saw(ε, j,m)∧ In(ε, l)∧On(ε, t)].
This explains how a large number of modifying phrases may be attached to verbs and
also accounts for a wide range of inferences concerning verbs and their modifiers. For
instance, from the above example we can infer ∃ε[Saw(ε, j,m)] by straightforward first-
order reasoning.
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Although Davidson’s work is not very well known to AI researchers, the logical analysis
it provides is very close to that employed by a wide variety of AI representations based on
reified events. In particular, semantic networks [33] typically treat an event as a special
kind of entity. Other entities are linked to the event by arcs describing their relationship to
the event. The main difference between this approach and Davidson’s analysis is that the
fundamental rôles of agent and patient (and perhaps also indirect object) are separated out
from the verb rather than treated as integral. Thus, many AI representations would exhibit
a logical form such as
∃ε[Saw(ε)∧ Agent(ε, j)∧ Patient(ε,m)∧ In(ε, l)∧On(ε, t)].
The difference between this and Davidson’s formulation does not seem to have any
concrete semantic significance and in developing our semantics we have found it more
intuitive to treat verbs as relation-like with a small fixed arity, as does Davidson. However,
as will be explained below, we do not treat the event variable as a hidden argument of the
verb but as bound to the verb by means of a kind of quantifier.
The ability to refer directly to individual event instances is undoubtedly useful for
representing certain kinds of knowledge. For instance, it enables one to represent adverbs
as predicates of events and allows the possibility of describing causality in terms of a binary
relation between events.
Event radicals. Galton [16,17] analyses events in terms of event radicals, syntactic
units which refer to event-types and combine with temporal aspect operators to form
propositions. For example, if the event-type John-tie-his-shoelace were operated on by the
progressive aspect, we would obtain the proposition Prog(John-tie-his-shoelace), meaning
that an event of type ‘John-tie-his-shoelace’ is in progress. We would read this as ‘John is
tying his shoelace’.
We want to encompass the essential insights of all these different approaches within a
single semantic framework. Our paper may be regarded as an attempt to produce a detailed
ontology (as advocated by, e.g., Guarino [23]) of time and events accounting for their
various linguistic manifestations. Whereas much recent work on ontology for AI systems
has been carried out at the level of axioms (e.g., [34]), ours is founded at the semantic
level. We give a rich intensional semantics, in terms of which all our temporal operators
are interpreted. This analysis is in some respects similar to Montague Semantics [39,40],
although we are concerned only with the various logical forms of temporal expression,
not with their syntactic realisation in a natural language. We do give axioms governing the
behaviour of our operators; but formulating a complete proof system is a subject for further
research.
It must be emphasised that the VEL formalism is not intended to contribute directly to
solving the problem of how to reason about actions and change. This problem involves
many factors that are completely beyond the scope of this work. In particular we do not
address the much studied frame problem or any of its sub-problems, which have been
studied in considerable detail within the AI literature (see, e.g., [3,8,25,27,42,44]). VEL
gives us a very general language for talking about time and events but is completely
agnostic about the workings of phenomena such as causality and inertia that determine
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what sequences of events are possible or likely.2 The question of whether practical
reasoning about events requires non-monotonic inference (or some other non-classical
form of entailment) is orthogonal to the issues addressed by VEL; indeed there is no reason
why such inference mechanisms could not be built on top of VEL.
It must be further acknowledged that even in terms of expressive power there is little that
can be said within VEL that could not be said by means of some other existing formalism.
However, the contribution of VEL is to put together a variety of expressive devices within
a single language, thus clarifying their logical interdependencies.
2. Temporal ontology
The semantics of our event logic must include a structure that determines relationships
between different times. The simplest model treats time as a set of linearly ordered points.
This set may be further constrained to be either discrete, dense or continuous and either
bounded or unbounded in each direction (or to satisfy more esoteric conditions). If we
want to be able to employ modal operators to distinguish between analytic and contingent
propositions, we shall need a richer structure in which there are possible states of the
world which do not occur at any point in the actual history of the world. We can think
of the set of all possible histories of the world as forming a branching tree structure.
A number of possible semantics and axiom sets based on such structures are discussed
in [47]. Branching structures have also been proposed as a basis for AI reasoning systems
[36,46] but this approach does not seem to have been widely adopted. However, in the
theory of computation, branching time logics such as CTL∗ [13] have been extensively
studied [14,37,38].
2.1. History structures
To model the temporal order of states of an evolving universe and the relationship
between possible alternatives to the actual history of the world we employ a structure that
we call a History Structure. This is a tuple H= 〈S,T ,≺,H 〉, where:
• S is a set {si} of world states (called simply states for short),
• T is a set {ti} of time points,
• ≺ is an irreflexive linear order on T (which may be further constrained to be dense,
continuous etc.),
• H is a set {hi} of histories, each of which is a function from T to S.
A pair 〈hi , ti〉 (where hi ∈H and ti ∈ T ) is the index of a possible world in the tree, and
hi(ti) denotes the world state that holds at that index. Each state is associated with a set of
entities Ns . An interval [t1 . . . t2] is the set {t | t ∈ T ∧ t1  t t2} of time points.
2 It can be argued that any language which is sufficiently expressive to describe a variety of different possible
models of causation must itself be to some degree neutral about the nature of causation.
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Thus defined, history structures can take a wide variety of different forms but our
commonsense view of time builds in an asymmetry between the past and the future: from
the perspective of any point in time there is a single determinate past but many possible
futures. To capture this intuition we specify a restricted class of history structures called
History Trees, characterised by the following properties:
SconfP (∀h1,h2 ∈H)[(h1 = h2)∨ (∃t ∈ T )(∀t′ ∈ T )[(h1(t′)= h2(t′))↔ (t′  t)]].
Gclock (∀h1,h2 ∈H)(∀t1, t2 ∈ T )[h1(t1)= h2(t2)→ (t1 = t2)].
SconfP gives strict confluence in the past: every two distinct histories agree up to and
including some time point and after that point they never agree.
Gclock tells us that we cannot have the same state at two distinct time points (there is a
‘global clock’).
The confluence property induces an equivalence relation on histories with respect to any
given time point:
h1
t≈ h2 ≡def (∀t′ ∈ T )
[
(t′  t)→ h1(t′)= h2(t′)
]
.
This means that the two histories agree on the states holding at all times up to and including
t (after which they may or may not diverge); it can be read as ‘h1 and h2 coincide up to t’.
The SconfP property implies that any two histories coincide up to some time point.
This model of branching time has the following useful properties: (a) on each history
the time structure is linear and can be described by a relatively simple logic; (b) reasoning
about alternative histories can be handled by an S5 modality.
One might for certain purposes want to drop or weaken either or both of the conditions
SconfP and Gclock. SconfP means that all possible states are accessible by travelling back
in time and then forward again along some alternative possible history. If we omit SconfP
we would allow other states that are not accessible in this way; and this would enable us to
introduce a language with a more general modalities of logical possibility and necessity.3
By omitting Gclock we allow the possibility that the same state may occur at different
times. This is useful if we want to think of states as configurations which are independent
of their place in the history structure. For instance, in [5] states are modelled in terms of
distributions of physical matter in space.
2.2. States
A world state h(t) ∈ S determines all those properties of the world at time t in history
h which are invariant across all the histories coincident with h up to t. We call these the
properties which are settled at t in h. If h1(t1)= h2(t2), this does not necessarily mean that
the same propositions are true at 〈h1, t1〉 and 〈h2, t2〉. This is because the truth of certain
propositions depends upon the future, which depends on the actual history.
In the present paper, the nature of states is left unanalysed. They are just elements in the
semantics. However, one might well want to associate a state with some further structure.
3 In this setting we could not, as we do in VEL, define  in terms of ∗ and Holds-at; we would have to define
it in terms of quantification over states.
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For instance one could identify states with distributions of matter (as in [5]) or with sets of
certain fundamental propositions.
It is worth emphasising that our notion of state corresponds to a total specification of all
properties, whereas there is another usage of ‘state’ which refers to some limited part or
aspect of the world. Thus one might want to talk, for instance, of the ‘state’ of John’s being
asleep. In the semantics of VEL this circumstance would hold in a set of world states, i.e.,
a subset of S. We call such a set a partial state. Moreover, the proposition ‘John is asleep’
would hold at a set {. . . 〈hi , ti〉 . . .} of index points corresponding to the set {. . .hi (ti ) . . .}
of states.
2.3. Episodes
In specifying the semantics for events we shall need to refer to the interval in which
an event occurs; however, an interval [t1 . . . t2] alone is not enough to locate the event
within the branches of the structure: we must also take into account the history on which it
occurs. This leads us to consider a pair 〈h, [t1 . . . t2]〉. We now observe that for any history
h′ coincident with h up to t2, the same sequence of states, and hence the same event, occurs.
Therefore we define the episode [t1 . . . t2]≈h (where t1  t2) by:
[t1 . . . t2]≈h =
{〈h′, [t1 . . . t2]〉 | h′ ∈H ∧ h′ t2≈ h
}
.
EpT denotes the set of all episodes on tree T .
Episodes are not themselves sets of time points so we do not distinguish whether
they are open or closed. However, the open/closed distinction becomes important when
we consider the time points over which a proposition is true. A proposition might be
true/false at all points within an episode, or at either of the end points of the episode,
or any combination of these.4
2.4. Event-types
An event-type is a set of episodes. This may be specified in various ways; one important
way of specifying event-types is in terms of partial states. For, example, given the partial
state S′ ⊆ S, the event-type
{[t . . .t]≈h | (∃t1, t2)
[
(t1 ≺ t≺ t2)∧
(∀t′)[((t1 ≺ t′ ≺ t)→ h(t′) /∈ S′)∧ ((t≺ t′ ≺ t2)→ h(t′) ∈ S′)]
]}
picks out inceptions of partial state S′, i.e., transitions between an interval over which S′
does not hold and an interval over which it does.
4 Questions of whether propositions are true over open or closed intervals (and the associated dividing instant
problem) are beyond the scope of the present paper. We believe that this depends on the particular proposition
in question and also (as in cases such as the light bulb switching from off to on) on the particular and somewhat
arbitrary stipulations that one must make to give precise truth conditions to natural language statements that are
normally used rather imprecisely. A discussion of these issues can be found in [20], especially pp. 343–345.
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2.5. Event-tokensEvent-tokens are occurrences of event-types. This being so it is tempting to regard
event-types as predicates over a domain of event tokens. Indeed this is the essence
of Davidson’s account. However, a naïve development of this idea can easily lead to
contradictions. These are most apparent when we try to formulate the conditions under





On the one hand it seems that l and a are disjoint kinds of event, since a token of l might
cause John’s leg to become stiff, whereas a token of a could not,5 so there can be no token
that is a token of both these types. If the two event-types apply to the same sequence of
world states then this just means that two different tokens occur simultaneously. However,
on the other hand, one might wish to say that a token of type la is also a token of both
type l and type a, since these are just less specific descriptions of a particular occurrence
described by la.
We believe that these intuitions about the token/type relationship cannot be reconciled
as long as we divorce event-tokens from their types. In our semantics an event-token is
always associated with the event-type of which it is a token. To model this we identify an
event token ε with a pair 〈η, e〉, where e is an event-type and η a specific episode over
which an event of that type occurs—i.e., we must have η ∈ e. Thus an event token can
regarded an episode seen from a certain perspective determined by an event-type.
Identity criteria for event-tokens are a very thorny philosophical issue and we do not
pretend that our semantics gives a fully adequate account. However, we do believe that
our theory is a reasonable simplification, which also allows one to make some useful
comparisons between event-tokens.
If two tokens occur over the same episode they are merely contemporaneous and not
necessarily connected in any other way. However, if e1 ⊂ e2, then this means that for every
episode (in every possible history) over which an event of type e1 occurs, an event of type
e2 also occurs. In other words, type e2 is a generalisation of type e1. Correspondingly, if
we have ε1 = 〈η, e1〉 and ε2 = 〈η, e2〉, then, although these are distinct tokens, ε2 can be
seen as representing the same occurrence as ε1 but from a more general perspective.
2.6. Entities and individuals
In standard first-order logic, names are taken as basic expressions denoting individuals,
which are taken as satisfying a fixed set of predicates. However, in a temporal language in
5 Clearly, identical event-tokens must participate in the same causal relationships. Davidson [10] proposed
that, conversely, causal equivalence is a sufficient condition for the identity of event tokens. But our argument
does not depend on this stronger claim.
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which one can describe events and changes one must be able to refer to individuals which
persist through time although their properties may change. In the context of our history tree
model of time, we stipulate that an individual is realised in each world state (in which it
exists) by an entity. These entities correspond to ‘time slices’ of individuals located within
the branching history structure. Thus an individual is modelled by a function from states
to entities. At those worlds where an individual does not exist it denotes the value ø. If
at some state s two individuals correspond to the same entity we say they are co-realised
at s.
Formally, the time structure together with the individuals which inhabit it is modelled
by a VEL frame. This is a structure: F = 〈T ,N, I 〉 where
• T = 〈S,T ,≺,H 〉 is a history tree.
• N is a set of entities,
• I is a set of individuals, each of which is a function from S to N ∪ {ø}.
In this general semantics, no constraints are imposed on the set of entities or on the
functions corresponding to individuals. However, one might well want to add further
constraints which tie the theory to some particular model of reality. For instance, in [5] the
‘entities’ are taken as regular open subsets of R3, which correspond to possible extensions
of individuals.
Note that we have chosen to identify individuals as functions from states to entities
rather than using a slightly more general model in which individuals are identified with
functions from H × T to S. Thus, at any given time t, each individual function will have
the same value in all histories that coincide up to t. This seems to be a natural condition
which corresponds to the way that we normally use proper names: the attribution of a
name does not depend on any assumptions or predictions about the future of the individual
in question.6
2.7. Verbs
In the current paper we take a rather coarse-grained view of the combination of verbs
with their arguments. We shall model a verb as a function from tuples of individuals to
event-types. To allow for possible indexicality within a verb expression we treat verbs as
intensional, so that this function will also depend on the history and time at which the verb
is evaluated.
6 However, if we were to weaken the conditions SconfP and Gclock, so that the same state could occur at
more than one point in a history structure, we might also want to modify the semantics of individuals to allow
individual functions to have different values for different occurrences of the same state. Suppose, in some state s
we have two rigid objects a and b that are physically identical (but in different locations and thus having different
properties relative to other objects). Then after a sequence of movements of the objects we may reach a state that
is physically identical to s except that the positions of a and b are interchanged. So if we take the final state as
a recurrence of the initial state, we see that the properties of a and b (and hence the entities that their individual
functions denote) are not determined only by the state.
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2.8. PropositionsThe propositional expressions of the VEL language have a truth value (t or f) that will
in general vary according to the history and time at which the proposition is evaluated (and
also according to the interpretation of its non-logical symbols). We could allow truth values
to vary arbitrarily over the indices 〈h, t〉 of a history tree; however, in so far as propositions
are used to describe properties of the real world, we believe that it is desirable to constrain
their temporal variability to rule out some pathological models. Specifically, we impose the
condition that it is not possible for a proposition to change its truth value infinitely often
during a finite period of time.
Infinitely frequent oscillation of a proposition’s truth value is sometimes called
intermingling [12,19,21]. Prohibiting intermingling is equivalent to requiring that for every
proposition ϕ and any time point t, there are time points t1 and t2, where t1 < t< t2, such
that the truth value of ϕ is constant for all time points in the open interval (t1, t) and is also
constant (though not necessarily with the same truth value) over the open interval (t, t2).
This latter formulation of the condition corresponds directly to the VEL axioms that we
shall employ in Section 7 to enforce non-intermingling.
3. Informal overview of the VEL language
In Sections 4 and 5 we shall give a fully formal syntax and semantics for VEL but first
we consider the language from an informal point of view.
It should be noted that in the formal semantics each expression will be given a
denotation relative to an index point 〈h, t〉 within a history tree structure. At this point
h is the actual history, t is the actual time and the value of h(t) is the actual state.
3.1. Variables and nominal terms
In VEL there are six types of object that can be named and quantified over. These types
and the variables that are used to denote them are as follows:





• observable values—oi .
3.2. Logical functions and predicates
A small number of logical functions are used to transfer information between different
semantic types:
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• b(δ) and e(δ) return times which are respectively the beginning and end points of the
interval δ.
• state(τ ) gives the world state that obtains at the time denoted by τ in the actual history.
• dur(ε) gives the interval of occurrence of the event token ε.
The following logical predicates are also employed:
• α = β is true just in case the terms α and β have the same extension.
• τ1  τ2 is true just in case the time term τ1 denotes a time equal to or earlier than τ2.
• AT(τ ) is true just in case τ denotes the actual time.
The proposition AT(τ ) is true only at index points 〈h, t〉, where the index t is the time
point denoted by the object language time term τ . The AT predicate can be used to construct
propositions whose truth at a given time point depends on other time points. For example,
AT(t)∧ (∃t ′)[(t ′  t)∧ϕ(t ′)] is true iff ϕ(t ′) holds for some t ′ that is before or equal to the
actual time.
3.3. Count nouns and quantifiers over individuals
A component of VEL that is probably unfamiliar to most AI researchers is the use of
Gupta’s [24] theory of count nouns. At each index 〈h, t〉, a count noun picks out a set of
individuals. This means that the entities picked out by a count noun are doubly relative
to the possible world (as identified by the index) at which a count noun expression is
evaluated: the count noun is evaluated at some possible world to give a set of individuals
which are instances of the count noun. Each individual must in turn be evaluated relative
to a possible world to yield an entity existing at that world (see Section 2.6 above).
The reason for this double relativity is that we very often employ count nouns to pick
out individuals at some particular world and then consider properties of these individuals at
another world. For example, in the sentence “Some girl will become president of the USA”,
the phrase “some girl” quantifies over individuals who are girls at the present time. The
individual concepts corresponding to these girls will denote different entities in different
possible worlds but in many of these worlds those entities will not be girls. Thus the claim
(at least in one reading) does not imply that the predicted female president will still be
young when she takes office.
Quantification over individuals takes the form
(∀C, x)[ϕ(x)],
where C is a count noun. The count noun operates like a sort but it also fixes the trans-
world identity conditions of quantified variables by determining the entities denoted by an
individual variable at each index in the history tree.
We also define:
(D1) (∃C, x)ϕ(x) ≡def ¬(∀C, x)¬ϕ(x),
(D2) C(α) ≡def (∃C, x)[x = α],
(D3) C[α] ≡def (∃C, x)[(x = α)].
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C[α] means that α denotes one of the individuals that is (at the actual index) a C; whereas,
C(α) means that α denotes an individual that is merely co-realised by some individual that
is a C. Thus we might write:
(∃PRESIDENT, a)[WOMAN[a]],
since presidents and women are both individuals of the same kind and share the same
trans-world identity criteria; but
(∃QUANTITY-OF-WOOD, a)[SHIP(a)],
since, although ships and quantities of wood may be materially identical (co-realised) in
some world state, they do not have the same trans-world identity criteria (e.g., consider the
ship of Theseus).
3.4. Propositional operators
VEL includes a variety of well-known temporal operators and modalities. P and F
are past and future tense operators defined in the normal way.  is just an S5 modality
operator—ϕ is true if ϕ is true at every index point. The ∗ operator is a bit more subtle:
∗ϕ is true at 〈h, t〉 if ϕ is true at t in all histories which share the same initial segment as h
up to time t. Thus, ∗ Fϕ means that ϕ is ‘inevitable’. Dual operators ♦ and ♦∗ are defined
in terms of  and ∗ in the usual way. (♦∗ can be used to model the E operator of CTL∗
[13], which has a similar interpretation.)
We also have operators ϕ and ϕ, meaning respectively that ϕ ‘has just been true’ or
‘is just about to become true’. ϕ is rather like the standard ‘next time’ operator, except
that it makes sense within a dense of continuous time series. It means that ϕ is true over
some open set of time points, whose greatest lower bound is the actual time.  is defined
analogously. Such operators were proposed by Barringer et al. [4].
3.5. Relations and verbs
Relations represent arbitrary intensional constraints over the universe of possible
denotations of nominal terms. At each index point an n-ary relation is associated with
the set of n-tuples drawn from this universe for which the relation holds. These tuples must
respect the type of the relation (see Section 5.1 below). Verbs combine with one or more
expressions denoting individuals to produce an expression that denotes an event-type. At
each index a verb is associated with a mapping from n-tuples of individuals to event-types.
3.6. Syntactic roles of event-types
Expressions of the category of event-type can combine with other expressions in various
different ways.
Event modalities. In the style of dynamic logics we employ event-types within a
propositional operation [e]ϕ, which says that ϕ holds in all states accessible from the
current state via an occurrence of an event of type e. The dual operator 〈e〉ϕ is defined
in the usual way.
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The Occurs relation. The Occurs relation provides a flexible way of talking about types of
events in terms of conditions which hold before and after (and perhaps also during) the time
period over which an event of that type takes place. For example, following Galton [20],
we could define the event-type where a body moves between two positions by:
(∀BODY, b)(∀r1, r2)[Occurs(move(b, r1, r2), δ)↔
Holds-at((ext(b)= r1),begin(δ))∧Holds-at((ext(b)= r2),end(δ))∧
∀t[(b(δ) < t < e(δ))→ Holds-at((ext(b) = r1 ∧ ext(b) = r2), t)].
Here ri are observable variables. ext is a function returning an observable value giving the
region occupied by an individual.7 The moving object b is constrained to be at r1 at the
beginning of the movement and r2 at the end, and it cannot be at either of these locations
at any other time within the movement. We do not suggest that this corresponds exactly
to what we would in natural language call a ‘movement’, which is ambiguous in various
ways.
Quantifying over singular events. A quantification over event-tokens is a formula of the
form 〈∀e, ε〉[ϕ(ε)]. Allowing event-types to act as sortals in quantification over event
tokens provides a mechanism for associating event-types with event token variables.
Because the event-token variable carries with it an event-type as well as an episode the
truth conditions of properties of event-tokens (and also the values of functions involving
them) are not determined solely by the time period over which they occur. If we allowed
unrestricted quantification over singular events, the language would become second-order.
This is because we would be implicitly quantifying over the associated event-types, and
event-types are interpreted as sets of episodes.8
Aspect operators. The operators Perf ,Pros and Prog operate on event-type expressions
to produce propositions. Perf (e), Pros(e) and Prog(e) mean respectively that event e has
happened, will happen, and is happening.9 If we want to say that an event is in progress
without asserting that it will definitely be completed we can use the form ♦∗Prog(e). We
can say that an event is just about to happen using the form ¬Prog(e)∧ Prog(e) (that an
event has just been completed can be represented similarly but with ).
Subsumption and identity of event-types. We will sometimes want to relate one event-
type expression to another, either by saying that they are equivalent: e1 ≡ e2; or that one is
a ‘more specific’ type of event than another: e1  e2. In terms of occurrence, these mean
7 The semantics of spatial extensions and relationships between them will not be considered in this paper;
however, Bennett [5] presents a language called O, which is compatible with VEL and does have a semantics that
explicitly models spatial extensions of moving material bodies.
8 By defining very general types of event we can often express properties that might appear to require
quantification over all event-tokens. We do this in our formulation of Event Calculus in Section 9.2, where we
quantify over the type any-event defined in (D41).
9 In the case of instantaneous event-types the construct Prog e doesn’t really make sense (see [16] for a
discussion of this). But according to the formal semantics given later in this paper it will always be false.
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that for every interval over which an event of type e1 occurs, an event of type e2 also
occurs, and in the case of ≡ the converse also holds.
3.7. Event-type abstraction
The construct 〈δ :ϕ〉 serves as a powerful means of defining event-types in terms of
conditions on the time intervals over which they occur. Typically δ will occur as a free
variable in ϕ, in which case we may write 〈δ :ϕ(δ)〉. When evaluated at an index 〈h, t〉,
the expression 〈δ :ϕ(δ)〉 refers to the event-type corresponding to the set of all episodes
[t1 . . . t2]≈h such that ϕ([t1 . . . t2]) is true at index 〈h′, t〉.10 To illustrate the use of event
abstraction, let us define11 a verb collide(a, b) describing (punctual) collision events
between two individuals:
(∀ BODY, a, b)[collide(a, b) ≡
〈δ : ((b(δ)= e(δ)= t)∧ Holds-at(C(a, b)∧ ¬C(a, b), t))〉]
Here C is the connection relation of the RCC spatial theory [41].
3.8. Holds-at and Holds-in
VEL includes the construct Holds-at(ϕ, τ ), which has been employed in many AI
representations. It is true just in case ϕ is true (in the actual history) at the time point
denoted by τ .
Holds-in(ϕ, ς) asserts that ϕ is ‘settled’ as true at the state s denoted by ς . This means
that ϕ is true at every index 〈h, t〉 such that h(t)= s.
4. Syntax
We now formally specify the syntax of VEL.
4.1. Variables and non-logical constants
The language has variables of six nominal types, σi, σt , σδ , σε , σs, σo , which can be
quantified over. Any variable that is not bound by a quantifier behaves as a constant. The
vocabulary sets of these types of variables are respectively:
• Individuals, Vi = {a, b, c, . . .}.
• Times, Vt = {ti}.
• Intervals, Vδ = {δi}.
10 Thus, in general, the abstracted event-type depends on the time t of the point of evaluation; but in most
useful cases ϕ(δ) will actually be invariant over time, unless ϕ contains some embedded indexical.
11 In fact we give a universal identity axiom; but, if we take C as being primitive, we can regard the r.h.s. of the
identity as a definition of collide(a, b).
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• Event-Tokens, Vε = {εi}.
• States, Vs = {si}.
• Observable Values, Vo = {oi}.
In many cases quantification over times, intervals, events and world states can be
avoided by the use of tense and aspect operators, modal operators and various other
constructs. For practical applications one might employ sublanguages of VEL that allow
little or no quantification.
Four other types of non-logical constant are not quantified over:12
• Count nouns, Vc = {Ci}.
• Relations, VR = {A,B,C, . . .}.
• Functions, Vf = {fi}.
• Verbs, Vv = {vi}.
A VEL vocabulary is thus a 10-tuple V = 〈Vi ,Vt ,Vδ,Vε,Vs ,Vo,Vc,VR,Vf ,Vv〉. The sets
VR , Vf and Vv are partitioned into sub-classes according to the numbers and types of
arguments that these expressions can combine with.
It may seem that the diversity of syntactic types in VEL is excessive; but the idea of VEL
is to be inclusive and to incorporate as many as possible of the kinds of expression that have
been employed in temporal representations. VEL is not intended to provide a practical logic
but rather a comprehensive umbrella language into which many other formalisms can be
translated.13
4.2. Terms and functions
There are three types of term:
• variables (of the six nominal types),
• the symbol null (of type σi ),
• functional terms of the form f (β1, . . . , βn), where β1, . . . , βn are terms and f ∈ Vf .
Functions come in a variety of different types according to the nominal types they accept
as arguments and the nominal type of the resulting functional term. A function type is
described by a pair 〈σ0, 〈σ1, . . . , σn〉〉 specifying the result and argument types respectively.
12 In principle we could also allow quantification over these; but we would then immediately get a second order
language which would be highly intractable and most probably unaxiomatisable.
13 It might be argued that to obtain a still more comprehensive logic we should also have variables referring
to histories. We have chosen not to do so here. While this does to some extent limit the expressive power of
the language relative to its semantics, we do not believe that this is a serious shortcoming. Unrestricted history
quantification does not seem to correspond to any structure found in normal temporal discourse. Moreover, a
restricted (and arguably more natural) version of quantification over histories can be expressed in VEL by the ∗
operator, which will be introduced below.
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The unary logical functions b and e are both of type 〈σt , 〈σδ〉〉, state is of type 〈σs , 〈σt 〉〉
and dur of type 〈σδ, 〈σε〉〉).
4.3. Event-type expressions
An event-type, or σe, expression is either:
• a 0-ary verb ∈ Vv ,
• an expression v(α1, . . . , αn), where v is an n-ary verb ∈ Vv and the αs are of type σi ,
• an event abstraction 〈δ :ϕ〉, where δ is any variable of type σδ and ϕ is a proposition
(as defined below).
4.4. Propositions
An atomic proposition has one of the following forms:
• α1 = α2, where the α’s are terms of the same type,
• τ1  τ2, where the τ ’s are terms of type σt ,
• AT(τ ), where τ is a term of type σt ,
• R(β1, . . . , βn), where R ∈ VR and β1, . . . , βn are terms.
Each argument of a given relation R must be of a specific nominal type. The type of an
n-ary relation can be described by a tuple 〈σ1, . . . , σn〉, where the σ s are the types of its
arguments (the result type always being a proposition).
More generally, a proposition of VEL is either an atomic proposition or has one of the
forms:
• one of: ¬ϕ, ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2, Fϕ, Pϕ, ϕ, ∗ ϕ, ϕ, ϕ,
• Holds-at(ϕ, τ ), where τ is of type σt ,
• Holds-in(ϕ, ς), where ς is of type σs ,
• Occurs(e, δ), where e is of type σe and δ is of type σδ ,
• [e]ϕ, where e is of type σe,
• (∀χ)ϕ, where χ is a variable of one of the types σt , σδ, σs, σo ,
• (∀κ,υ)ϕ, where κ is of type σc and υ is a variable of type σi ,
• 〈∀θ, ε〉ϕ, where θ is of type σe and ε is a variable of type σε ,
• one of: Perf θ , Progθ , Prosθ , where θ is type σe,
where in each case ϕ is any VEL proposition.
5. Formal semantics
We now give a fully formal semantics wherein each well formed VEL expression
is evaluated relative to an index 〈h, t〉 on a VEL frame and an assignment A, which
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determines the values of non-logical constants. We write ❏α❑A to refer to the denotationh,t
of α at index 〈h, t〉 according to the assignmentA.
For a propositional expression ϕ the value of ❏ϕ❑Ah,t is either t or f. In this case it is often
convenient to use the notation ❏ϕ❑TS to denote the set of assignments and indices for which
ϕ is true—i.e., the ‘truth set’ of ϕ. Formally we have ❏ϕ❑TS = {〈A,h, t〉 | ❏ϕ❑Ah,t = t}.
To describe the semantics of expressions such as quantifiers, we will need to talk
about certain classes of similar assignments. We use the notation A(x→v) to refer to that
assignmentA′ which assigns the value v to the variable x and for all other variables assigns
exactly the same values as A.
5.1. VEL model structures
A VEL model is a structureM= 〈F ,O,V,A〉, where:
• F = 〈T ,N, I 〉 is a VEL frame, with T = 〈S,T ,≺,H 〉,
• O is the set of possible values of observables,
• V is a vocabulary,
• A is an assignment structure.
The assignment structure A is used to interpret all the non-logical atomic symbols of
VEL. Specifically, A= 〈ai, at , aδ, aε, as, ao, aR, af , ac, av〉, where:
• ai :Vi → I assigns an individual to each individual variable.
• at :Vt → T assigns a time point to each time variable.
• aδ :Vδ → (T × T ) assigns to each interval variable an interval [t1 . . . t2], such that
t1  t2.
• aε :Vε → (EpT ×℘(EpT )), assigns to each event-token variable a pair 〈η,E〉, where
η is episode and E is a set of episodes and η ∈E.
• as :Vs → S assigns a state to each state variable.
• ao :Vo →O assigns an observable value to each observable variable.
• ac :Vc → ((H × T )→ ℘(I)) assigns to each count noun a function from indices to
sets of individuals.
• av :Vv → ((H × T × In)→℘(EpT )) assigns a denotation to each n-ary verb, this is
a mapping from history and time indices and tuples of individuals to sets of episodes.
The assignment functions aR and af are slightly harder to specify because of the variety
of argument types. For each nominal type σ let Uσ be the range of aσ . Then, for relations
of type σ = 〈σ1, . . . , σn〉 we have:
• aRσ :VR → ((H × T ) → ℘(Uσ1 × · · · × Uσn)) assigns to each relation symbol a
mapping from indices to the set of tuples of objects (from domains appropriate to
the type σ ) that satisfy the relation;
and for functions of type σ = 〈σ0, 〈σ1, . . . , σn〉〉
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• afσ :Vo → ((H × T )→ ((Uσ1 × · · · × Uσn)→ Uσ0)) assigns a suitable intensional
function to each function symbol of type σ .
We can then define generic functions aR and af which can be applied respectively to any
relational or any functional symbol:
• aR =⋃σ afσ ,• af =⋃σ aRσ .
To ensure that the propositions constructed from the basic vocabulary are not affected by
intermingling (see Section 2.8) we need to impose some further condition on VEL models.
Specifically, we require that all those denotations which are functions of time (i.e., the
denotations of individuals, count nouns, verbs, relations and functions) do not oscillate
infinitely often within any finite interval. Also, the denotations of any pair of individuals
cannot be such that they change to and from being co-realised infinitely often in a finite
period; and the set of episodes in any event-type (or in the episode set associated with an
event-token) cannot contain an infinite number of episodes that share a common history and
either begin or end infinitely often within some finite interval. Because these constraints are
somewhat awkward to specify formally, we instead express them in terms of the general
condition that
• for any proposition ϕ, the value ❏ϕ❑Ah,t cannot change its value infinitely often within
a finite time interval.
This implicitly imposes the required restrictions on all denotations of propositional
constituents.
5.2. The semantic denotation function
We now specify the semantic denotation for all meaningful expressions of VEL using
standard set theory and quantification as a meta-language. Variables ti range over elements
of the set of times (T ) and hi range over histories (elements of H ). For any non-logical
symbol κ , A(κ) is the result of applying to κ the appropriate function in A, according to
the type of κ .
5.2.1. Atomic symbols and nominal terms
(S1) ❏γ ❑Ah,t =A(γ ), where γ is any atomic non-logical symbol.
(S2) ❏null❑Ah,t = ø.
(S3) ❏b(δ)❑Ah,t = t1, where ❏δ❑Ah,t = [t1 . . . t2].
(S4) ❏e(δ)❑Ah,t = t2, where ❏δ❑Ah,t = [t1 . . . t2].
(S5) ❏state(τ )❑Ah,t = h(❏τ ❑Ah,t).
(S6) ❏dur(ε)❑Ah,t = [t1 . . . t2],where ❏ε❑Ah,t = 〈[t1 . . . t2]≈h ,E〉.
(S7) ❏g(β1, . . . , βn)❑Ah,t = af (g)(h, t, 〈❏β1❑Ah,t, . . . , ❏βn❑Ah,t〉).
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5.2.2. Event-type expressions
Complex event-types are constructed either by combining a verb with individual
constants or terms or by the event abstraction operator:
(S8) ❏v(α1, . . . , αn)❑Ah,t = av(v)(h, t, 〈ai(α1), . . . , ai(αn)〉).
(S9) ❏〈δ :ϕ〉❑Ah,t = {[t1 . . . t2]≈h | 〈Aδ→[t1···t2]),h′, t〉 ∈ ❏ϕ❑TS)}.
5.2.3. Atomic propositional formulae
(S10) ❏R(β1, . . . , βn)❑TS = {〈A,h, t〉 | 〈❏β1❑Ah,t, . . . , ❏βn❑Ah,t〉 ∈ aR(R)(h, t)}.
(S11) ❏α1 = α2❑TS = {〈A,h, t〉 | ❏α1❑Ah,t(h(t))= ❏α2❑Ah,t(h(t))}.
(S12) ❏τ1  τ2❑TS = {〈A,h, t〉 | ❏τ1❑Ah,t  ❏τ2❑Ah,t}.
(S13) ❏AT(τ )❑TS = {〈A,h, t〉 | ❏τ ❑Ah,t = t}.
5.2.4. Complex propositions
The Boolean connectives have standard interpretations:
(S14) ❏¬ϕ❑TS = {〈A,h, t〉 | 〈A,h, t〉 /∈ ❏ϕ❑T S}.
(S15) ❏ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2❑TS = ❏ϕ1❑TS ∩ ❏ϕ2❑TS .
The constructs Holds-at(ϕ, τ ) and ∗ϕ are interpreted as follows:
(S16) ❏Holds-at(ϕ, τ )❑TS = {〈A,h, t〉 | 〈A,h, ❏τ ❑Ah,t〉 ∈ ❏ϕ❑TS}.
(S17) ❏∗ϕ❑TS = {〈A,h, t〉 | (∀h′)[(h′ t≈ h)→〈A,h′, t〉 ∈ ❏ϕ❑TS]}.
The following clauses specify the various kinds of quantification that can be expressed in
VEL:
(S18) ❏(∀C, x)[ϕ]❑TS = {〈A,h, t〉 | (∀i)(i ∈ ❏C❑Ah,t → ❏ϕ❑A
(x→i)
h,t = t)}.




(S20) ❏∀ δ[ϕ]❑TS = {〈A,h, t〉 | (∀t1, t2)[(t1  t2)→ ❏ϕ❑A(δ→[t1 ...t2])h,t = t]}.
(S21) ❏∀χσ [ϕ]❑TS = {〈A,h, t〉 | (∀v ∈ Uχ )[❏ϕ❑A(χ→v)h,t = t]}, where σ is one of the types
σt , σs or σo and χσ is a variable of type σ .
Quantification over individuals is always restricted to those satisfying a given count noun.
Similarly event-token quantification is always over tokens of a given type. Quantification
over the other types is unrestricted.
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6. Definable constructsThe operators and constructs we defined semantically in the previous section constitute
the logical primitives of VEL. We shall now use these to define a much richer vocabulary
which provides a very expressive language for describing time and events, and in particular
allows one to use all the modes of temporal representation that were considered in
Section 1.
6.1. Temporal relations
The temporal relations <,  and > between time points have standard definitions in
terms of the primitives  and =. By using the functions b(δ) and e(δ), it is also trivial to
define each of Allen’s 13 relations that can hold between temporal intervals [1].
6.2. Propositional operators
Standard past and future tense operators are definable in terms of Holds-at and the AT
predicate.14
(D4) Pϕ ≡def (∃t1, t2)[AT(t1)∧ (t1 > t2)∧ Holds-at(ϕ, t2)].
(D5) Fϕ ≡def (∃t1, t2)[AT(t1)∧ (t1 < t2)∧ Holds-at(ϕ, t2)].
We also define the following tense-like operators that allow us to say that a proposition
is true throughout some open interval either immediately before or immediately after
the current time point. These enable one to describe the ways in which truth values of
propositions can change in dense or continuous time.
(D6) ϕ ≡def (∃t1, t2)[AT(t2)∧ (t1 < t2)∧ (∀t3)[(t1  t3 < t2)→ Holds-at(ϕ, t3)]].
(D7) ϕ ≡def (∃t1, t2)[AT(t1)∧ (t1 < t2)∧ (∀t3)[(t1 < t3  t2)→ Holds-at(ϕ, t3)]].
We now define the necessity operator ϕ, which says that ϕ is true at all index points
in the history tree model structure. The following definition is justified by the confluence
property of history trees enforced by the SconfP condition.
(D8) ϕ ≡def (∀t)[ Holds− at( ∗∀t ′[Holds-at(ϕ, t ′)], t)].
The following definitions characterise Galton’s [20,21] perturbation and dominance
relations which can be used to describe possible state changes in physical systems. One
proposition is a perturbation of another just in case it is possible for there to be a direct
transition between a state in which ϕ holds and a state in which ψ holds. ϕ is said to
dominate ψ iff: whenever an open interval over which ϕ holds immediately precedes or
14 Here we take P and F as referring strictly to the past and future, whereas some logics use weaker tense
operators such that whenever ϕ is true Pϕ and Fϕ are also true.
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follows an open interval over which ψ holds, then ϕ must also hold at the intermediate
point between these two intervals.
(D9) Perturbation(ϕ,ψ) ≡def ♦((ϕ ∧ (ψ ∨ ψ))∨ (ψ ∧ (ϕ ∨ ϕ))).
(D10) Dominates(ϕ,ψ) ≡def (((ϕ ∧ ψ) ∨ (ψ ∧ ϕ))→ ϕ).
6.3. Operators forming propositions from event-types
The Occurs predicate, which relates event-types to the intervals over which they occur,
has the following simple definition:
(D11) Occurs(e, δ) ≡def (∃e, ε)[dur(ε)= δ].
The aspect operators, which convert event radicals into propositions, are defined as follows:
(D12) Perf (e) ≡def (∃δ)(∃t)[AT(t)∧ (e(δ) t)∧Occurs(e, δ)].
(D13) Pros(e) ≡def (∃δ)(∃t)[AT(t)∧ (t  b(δ))∧Occurs(e, δ)].
(D14) Prog(e) ≡def (∃δ)(∃t)[AT(t)∧ (b(δ) < t < e(δ))∧Occurs(e, δ)].
We use the notation e(ε) to say that the event token ε is of type e. This is defined by
(D15) e(ε) ≡def (∃e, ε′)[ε = ε′].
We may also want to compare event-types. The relation e1  e2 means that e1 is a sub-type
of e2, and e1 ≡ e2 means that e1 and e2 are equivalent:
(D16) e1  e2 ≡def (∀δ)[Occurs(e1, δ)→Occurs(e2, δ)].
(D17) e1 ≡ e2 ≡def (e1  e2)∧ (e2  e1).
We can also define event modalities analogous to those used in dynamic logic:
(D18) [e]ϕ ≡def ∗ (∀δ)[(AT(b(δ))∧Occurs(e, δ))→ Holds-at(ϕ,e(δ))]].
(D19) 〈e〉ϕ ≡def ♦∗ (∃δ)[AT(b(δ)∧∧Occurs(e, δ)∧Holds-at(ϕ,e(δ))]].
6.4. Complex event-types
Using event abstraction we can define more complex event types. Conjunctive and
disjunctive event-types can be defined as follows:
(D20) 〈e1 $ e2〉 =def 〈δ : (Occurs(e1, δ)∧Occurs(e2, δ))〉.
(D21) 〈e1 unionsq e2〉 =def 〈δ : (Occurs(e1, δ)∨Occurs(e2, δ))〉.
We can also define an event-type corresponding to a concatenated sequence of two
component event-types:
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(D22) 〈e1; e2〉 =def 〈δ : (∃δ1, δ2)[Occurs(e1, δ1)∧Occurs(e2, δ2)∧b(δ)= b(δ1)∧e(δ1)=
b(δ2)∧ e(δ2)= e(δ)]〉.
We can introduce operators for converting an event-type, e, into punctual event-types
corresponding to beginnings and endings of events of type e:
(D23) 〈begine〉 =def 〈δ1 : (∃δ2)[Occurs(e, δ2)∧ b(δ1)= e(δ1)∧ b(δ1)= b(δ2)]〉.
(D24) 〈end e〉 =def 〈δ1 : (∃δ2)[Occurs(e, δ2)∧ b(δ1)= e(δ1)∧ e(δ1)= e(δ2)]〉.
VEL allows the definition of many more useful operators for forming complex event-types.
For instance we can define various types of ‘process’ consisting of sequences of repeating
and possibly overlapping sub-events. These will not be covered in the present paper.
6.5. Constructing event-types from propositions
It is often natural to define event-types by reference to the changing truth values
of propositions. Within VEL we can define punctual event types which occur at the
beginning and end points at which a proposition is true, or at points where a proposition is
instantaneously true:
(D25) 〈beginϕ〉 ≡def 〈δ : Holds-at((ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ),b(δ))∧ (b(δ)= e(δ))〉.
(D26) 〈endϕ〉 ≡def 〈δ : Holds-at((ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ),b(δ))∧ (b(δ)= e(δ))〉.
(D27) 〈instϕ〉 ≡def 〈〈beginϕ〉 $ 〈endϕ〉〉.
We can also regard the period of time over which a proposition is true as characterising an
event. It is convenient to first define Holds-on(ϕ, δ) to mean that ϕ holds at all time points
interior to the interval δ.15
(D28) Holds-on(ϕ, δ) ≡def (b(δ) < e(δ))∧ (∀t)[(b(δ) < t < e(δ))→ Holds-at(ϕ, t)].
We now define the construct 〈ϕ〉 to refer to the event-type which occurs during every
interval such that ϕ is true for all times between its end points:16
(D29) 〈ϕ〉 ≡def 〈δ : Holds-at(¬ϕ,b(δ))∧Holds-on(ϕ, δ)∧ Holds-at(¬ϕ,e(δ))〉.
Note that 〈ϕ〉 occurs over an interval whether or not ϕ holds at its end points. Depending on
the meaning of the proposition ϕ, intervals over which it holds may be either open or closed
at each end. However we could easily define more restricted operators that give event-types
corresponding to only open or only closed periods over which ϕ holds (or indeed periods
that are open at one end and closed at the other).
15 Note, that according to this definition, if δ is punctual no proposition Holds-on δ.
16 The expression 〈ϕ〉 has the same meaning as the ‘poϕ’ construct introduced in [16].
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6.6. Predicates and functions of statesUsing Holds-at and the state function together with the alternative history operator, we
can define the condition that a proposition holds in a particular state as follows:17
(D30) Holds-in(ϕ, s) ≡def (∀t)[state(t)= s→ Holds-at(∗ϕ, t)].
A proposition ϕ can only hold in a state s if the truth of ϕ at s does not depend on the
future, otherwise its truth value is not settled by the state and Holds-in(ϕ, s) is taken to be
false.
When describing scenarios in terms of states it is useful to have a predicate to pick out
the actual state and a function to give the time at which a state occurs:
(D31) AS(s) ≡def (∃t)[AT(t)∧ state(t)= s].
(D32) time(s)= τ ≡def ♦(state(τ )= s).
AS enables us to define useful relationships of accessibility between states. (e : s1 ⇒ s2)
says that one can get from state s1 to state s2 via an occurrence of an event of type e (this
relation is closely related to the accessibility relation of the [e] modal operator). s1 ⇒ s2
says that (either s1 = s2 or) on some history s2 lies in the future of s1.
(D33) (e : s1 ⇒ s2) ≡def ♦(AS(s1)∧ (∃δ)[AT(b(δ)∧Occurs(e, δ)∧ state(e(δ))= s2]).
(D34) (s1 ⇒ s2) ≡def (s1 = s2)∨♦(AS(s1)∧ F AS(s2)).
7. Proof theory
The logic VEL is not designed as a language for automated reasoning. It is a general
semantic theory of events, within which a variety of less expressive but more practical
representations can be embedded. Nevertheless, a proof system for VEL could be used
to test inferences within sublanguages of VEL and also for proving properties of the
relationships between these sublanguages. Given the complexity of VEL the task of
specifying an axiom system for the language is extremely difficult. Nevertheless we present
the following set of axioms which we believe is close to being complete relative to our
semantics.
7.1. An axiomatic proof system
We need to axiomatise the following undefined logical symbols: ¬ϕ, ϕ ∧ ψ , β1 = β2,
τ1  τ2, Holds-at(ϕ, t), AT(t), ∗ϕ, null, b(δ), e(δ), dur(ε), state(t), 〈δ : ϕ(δ)〉 and the six
kinds of quantifier.
17 If we were to weaken the SconfP and Gclock constraints on history trees, other definitions of Holds-in might
be more natural.
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7.1.1. Substitution notation
In stating the proof theory we shall use the following notation to specify the result of
substituting one variable for another in a formula:
• ϕt⇒t ′ is the result of substituting t ′ for one or more occurrences of t in ϕ, which do
not occur within the scope of a quantification w.r.t. either t or t ′.
• ϕtt ′ is the result of substituting t ′ for all occurrences of t in ϕ which do not occur
within the scope of a quantification w.r.t. t ′. None of these occurrences may occur
within the scope of a quantification w.r.t. t .
The first of these describes the type of substitution justified by an equality and the second
describes that used in instantiating a universal quantifier. In both cases the substituent must
be free and the substituent must not become bound.
7.1.2. Classical propositional logic
At the core of the system is the classical propositional logic:
(R1) ( ϕ if ϕ is a classical propositional theorem.
(R2) If ( ϕ and ( (ϕ→ψ) then ( ψ .
7.1.3. Identity and quantification theory
All types of nominal variables and terms obey the axioms of reflexive identity and
substitution of necessary identicals:
(A1) α = α, where α is any term.
(A2) ((α = α′)∧ ϕ)→ ϕα⇒α′ , where α and α′ are nominal terms of the same type.
Since VEL is an intensional logic, substitution generally requires necessary identity
rather then mere extensional identity. However, all variables except individuals are purely
extensional. Thus we have the following axiom:
(A3) (χ = χ ′)→(χ = χ ′), where χ and χ ′ are variables both of the same type, which
is one of σt , σδ , σs , σo or σε .
Although individuals are intensional, their reference at an index 〈h, t〉 is determined by the
state h(t). Thus, where h(t)= h′(t) (i.e., h and h′ are confluent at t) an individual constant
will have the same denotation at 〈h, t〉 and 〈h′, t〉. This semantic constraint is captured by
the axiom:
(A4) (α1 = α2)→ ∗ (α1 = α2), where α1 and α2 are symbols of type σi .
Variables denoting time points, intervals, states and observable values obey completely
standard quantification theory. Let ν be a variable of any of the types σt , σδ , σs or σo and
ν′ be any variable of the same type as ν. Then the proof theory for quantification over these
types of variable can be specified by the following rule and axiom:
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(R3) If ( (ϕ→ψ) then ( (ϕ→∀ν[ψ]), provided ν is not free in ϕ.
(A5) ∀ν[ϕ]→ ϕνν ′ .
7.1.4. Temporal logic
The temporal logic obeys the following inference rule and axioms:
(R4) If ( ϕ then ( Holds-at(ϕ, t).
(A6) (t  t ′ ∧ t ′  t ′′)→ t  t ′′.
(A7) t  t ′ ∨ t ′  t .
(A8) (t  t ′ ∧ t ′  t)↔ t = t ′.
(A9) (Holds-at(ϕ, t)∧Holds-at(ϕ→ ψ, t))→ Holds-at(ψ, t).
(A10) ¬Holds-at(ϕ ∧¬ϕ, t).
(A11) Holds-at(ϕ, t)∨Holds-at(¬ϕ, t).
(A12) Holds-at(ϕ, t)↔ Holds-at(Holds-at(ϕ, t), t ′).
(A13) t  t ′ ↔ Holds-at((t  t ′), t ′′).
(A14) ∀t[Holds-at(ϕ, t ′)]→ Holds-at(∀t[ϕ], t ′).
(A15) (AT(t)∧ AT(t ′))→ t = t ′.
(A16) Holds-at(AT(t), t).
(A17) ϕ→∃t[Holds-at(ϕ, t)].
Axioms (A6)–(A8) constrain the temporal comparison  to satisfy the usual axioms for a
total linear order. (A9) and (A10) ensure that the set of formulae holding at each time point
is closed under implication and consistent. (A11) ensures that, for every proposition ϕ, at
each time point either ϕ or ¬ϕ holds. (A14) means that time quantification commutes with
the Holds-at(. . . , t) construct. Finally, axioms (A15)–(A17) give essential properties of the
AT(t) predicate.
The temporal axioms given so far constrain time to be an arbitrary linear order. For
applications in ontological modelling of physical processes there are strong arguments for
requiring that time be dense (see, e.g., [20,22]). This can easily be ensured by adding the
axiom:18
(A18) ∀t1t2[t1 < t2 →∃t[t1 < t < t2]].
To ensure that the truth values of propositions do not fluctuate infinitely often in a finite
period of time we also impose the following axioms, which can be concisely expressed
using the  and  operators:
(A19) ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ.
(A20) ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ.
18 One might also want time to be continuous; but this requires a second-order axiom and doesn’t seem to be
necessary for most applications.
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These say that at each time point any proposition has a constant truth value during
some open interval immediately following that point and also during some open interval
immediately preceding the point.19
7.1.5. The ∗ operator
The ∗ operator satisfies the following proof rule and axioms:20
(R5) If ( ϕ then ( ∗ϕ.
(A21) (∗ϕ ∧∗ (ϕ→ ψ))→ ∗ψ .
(A22) ∗ϕ→ ϕ.
(A23) ♦∗ϕ→ ∗ ♦∗ϕ.
(A24) AT(t)→ ∗AT(t).
(A25) t  t ′ → ∗ (t  t ′).
(A26) ∀tt ′[Holds-at(∗ϕ, t)∧ t  t ′ → Holds-at(∗Holds-at(ϕ, t), t ′)].
(R5) is the rule of necessitation and axioms (A21)–(A23) are the standard modal schemata
K, T and 5. Thus ∗ is an S5 modal operator. Axioms (A24) and (A25) ensure that the
actual time and all temporal inequalities are the same for alternative histories. Finally,
(A26) captures the interaction between ∗ and the Holds-at(ϕ, t) construct, arising from
the fact that all historical alternatives at a given time share a common history up to that
time.21
7.1.6. Intervals
The b and e functions obey the following axioms, which ensure that the beginning of an
interval cannot come after its end and that there is a unique interval determined by every
two time points:
(A27) b(δ) e(δ).
(A28) (t1  t2)→ (∃δ)[t1 = b(δ)∧ t2 = e(δ)].
(A29) (b(δ1)= b(δ2)∧ e(δ1)= e(δ2))→ (δ1 = δ2).
19 These axioms are not equivalent: for example, in real-number time, if ϕ is true on the intervals
(2−2n,2−2n+1)) (for n = 1,2,3, . . .) and at no other times, then (A20) holds throughout but (A19) is false at
t = 0. If the temporal theory were combined with a theory of physical reality, it is possible that these axioms
might be derivable from basic continuity properties of physical change.
20 These axioms were inspired by a set given by Thomason [47] and attributed to Kamp [31] for a logic
whose models are similar to but somewhat less constrained than our history trees. Kamp found that his axioms
were incomplete relative to his intended models, because they do not support inferences dependent on temporal
interpolations involving more than one history; however, we believe that our explicit axiomatisation of a time
structure shared by all histories circumvents this problem.
21 Since ∗ is an S5 modality one can derive both the Barcan formula and the converse Barcan formula for ∗
with respect to time quantification—i.e., we have the theorem ∀t[∗ ϕ] ↔ ∗ ∀t[ϕ].
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7.1.7. Count nouns
To specify the logic of count nouns we use a proof rule and axioms which are a
simplification of those given by Gupta [24].22 Count noun quantification obeys the rule:23
(R6) If ( ϕ→ψ then ( ϕ→ (∀C, x)[ψ], provided x is not free in ϕ
as well as the axioms:
(A30) ((∀C, x)ϕ ∧ C[a])→ ϕxa .
(A31) (∀C, x)C[x], provided x is not free in C.
(A32) ¬C(null).
Rule (R6) and axiom (A30) provide a standard basis for quantification theory, with the
slight modification that the substitutions allowed by (A30) are restricted to individuals
falling under the appropriate count noun. Axiom (A31) specifies a connection between
count noun quantification and necessary identity.24 (A32) ensures that the null entity does
not belong to the domain of any count noun.
Gupta also motivates the adoption of the following count noun separation axiom,25
which we may want to impose, although it is not actually necessitated by the model theory
given for VEL. The axiom enforces the condition that if the same count noun applies (or
possibly applies) to each of two co-realised, non-null individuals, then those individuals
must be identical (i.e., co-realised at all worlds). Equivalently, if two individuals are co-
realised but not identical then they must be individuals of different categories, having
different identity and persistence criteria (e.g., a pot and a lump of clay):
(A33) (a = b ∧¬(a = null)∧♦C[a] ∧ ♦C[b])→(a = b).
We also add the axiom (A34), which enforces the condition that the individuals falling
under a count noun (at the index point where it is evaluated) must have a non-empty
extension (at that index).
(A34) (∀C, x)[¬(x = null)].
22 The only substantial difference is that we (in (A2)) always require necessary identity to permit substitutions,
whereas Gupta allows extensionally equivalent individual variables to be substituted into contexts that are not
within the scope of a modal operator. This is because our semantics allows atomic relations and verbs to be
intensional, so no context can be guaranteed transparent by considering its syntax alone.
23 Actually Gupta uses the weaker proof rule: if ( ϕ then ( (∀C, x)[ψ]; and adds the further axioms
((∀C, x)(ϕ → ψ) ∧ (∀C, x)ϕ)→ (∀C, x)ψ and ϕ → (∀C, x)ϕ, provided x is not free in ϕ. Together these are
equivalent to our stronger proof rule.
24 Recall that C[x] ≡def (∃C, x′)[(x = x′)]. Gupta says that this axiom may not be independent of the others
but we have not been able to derive it.
25 We actually use Gupta’s AS13∗ , the weaker of two separation axioms that he considers.
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7.1.8. Event quantification
The event quantification employed in VEL takes the form of quantifying over the event-
tokens of a particular event-type. This is much the same as ordinary sorted quantification
and inferences involving event quantifiers can be reduced to the following simple rules:
(R7) If ( (ϕ→ψ) then ( (ϕ→〈∀e, ε〉[ψ]), provided ε does not occur free in ϕ.
(A35) (〈∀e, ε〉ϕ ∧ e(ε′))→ ϕεε′ .
7.1.9. Event abstraction and the dur function
The following axiom characterises the event abstraction operator by ensuring that the
intervals over which the instances of an abstracted event-type occur satisfy the interval
predicate that was used to make the abstraction:26
(A36) ϕ(δ)↔〈∃〈δ′ :ϕ(δ′)〉, ε〉[dur(ε)= δ].
7.1.10. States and the state function
Finally we ensure that the state function respects the structure of the history frames. We
need to ensure that the history tree constraint Gclock holds, that every two histories have
a confluence point, and that this point is unique (SconfP):
(A37) (state(t1)= s ∧♦state(t2)= s)→ t1 = t2.
(A38) (∀s1, s2)(∃s3)[(s3 ⇒ s1)∧ (s3 ⇒ s2)].
(A39) (∀t1, t2)[(t1 < t2 ∧ state(t1)= s1 ∧ state(t2)= s2)→
(state(t2)= s2 → state(t1)= s1)].
7.2. Completeness
The task of establishing a complete axiom system for VEL is ongoing work. However,
Bennett [7] does give a completeness proof for a large fragment of the logic including
the constructs: ¬ϕ, ϕ ∧ ψ , β1 = β2, τ1  τ2, Holds-at(ϕ, t), AT(t), ∗ϕ, together with
quantification over time variables. That paper shows that the proof system consisting of
rules (R1)–(R17) and axioms (A1)–(A4) is complete (for that sub-language) with respect
to the branching history semantics.
Our axioms for interval variables and the b and e functions are very straightforward
and we believe that it will be a routine matter to extend the completeness proof to include
this part of the language. Gupta [24] proves completeness of his axioms with respect to a
very general modal semantics which seems to be compatible with the more specialised
semantics of VEL. However, giving a rigorous completeness proof for the count-noun
axioms within the setting of VEL would be a substantial task. As regards our axioms for
event quantification, abstraction and the state function, these are based on our intuitive
26 Expressed in terms of the defined Occurs relation, (A36) becomes ϕ(δ)↔Occurs(〈δ′ :ϕ(δ′)〉, δ). And from
this it is easy to prove that (e≡ 〈δ :ϕ(δ)〉)↔∀δ[ϕ(δ)↔Occurs(e, δ)].
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understanding of the VEL models. Here it is possible that we have omitted some essential
property.
8. Additional logical constraints
Because of the general nature of our semantics, possible interpretations of certain types
of expression are more fluid than one would normally want. Specifically, since expressions
such as relations, event-types and count nouns are intensional they could have quite
different ‘meanings’ at different indices in a history tree. This limits the class of valid
inferences involving multiple index points. Clearly, most ordinary concepts have a much
more rigid meaning than this. Hence we present a number of constraints which one will
often wish to apply to the basic vocabulary of theories formulated within VEL.27
8.1. Static relations
In general, relation symbols may correspond to intentional relationships holding among
individuals. However, many fundamental relations are extensional in that, at every index
point, whether the relation holds of some tuple of individuals depends only on the entities
denoted by the individuals at the particular state corresponding to that index point. In other
words the truth of these relations depends on the actual state of the world. We thus refer to
them as static relations. Amongst the static relations are all spatial relations and most other
physical properties. An example of a non-static relation is ‘is-approaching(a, b)’.
A static predicate ϕ(x) satisfies the following axiom schema, which means that only
extensional equivalence (rather than necessary identity) is required for substitution into
ϕ(x).
(C1) (ϕ(α)∧ (α = β))→ ϕ(β).
8.2. Subjective event-types
Normally the meaning of an event-type expression is objective in that whatever possible
world it is evaluated at, it denotes the same set of episodes. However, within the intensional
language of VEL it is possible to define subjective event-types whose denotation is not
constant. For instance we might define a type consisting of all accidents that take place
during ‘the next snow storm’. Since ‘the next snow storm’ varies according where we
are in a VEL frame, any event-type defined in terms of a phrase such as this would be
subjective.
Subjective event-types do not correspond to events in the ordinary sense but they arise
inevitably within a sufficiently rich intensional language. Most events which one will want
to talk about are not subjective and satisfy:
27 Originally we attempted to build such constraints into the actual semantics of VEL but we found that this
was incompatible with the definitional capabilities of the language.
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(C2) Holds-at((∀e, ε)ϕ, t)↔ (∀e, ε)Holds-at(ϕ, t).
(C3) (∀s1, s2)[♦(e : s1 ⇒ s2)→(e : s1 ⇒ s2)].
8.3. Verbs of direct participation
Participation in many verbs is determined completely by the static properties exem-
plified by individuals during the period over which the events corresponding to that verb
occur. In the place of an individual argument α of such a verb we can substitute any other
individual which is co-realised by α at all indices during the episode over which the event
occurs. For instance if a ship burns then the quantity of wood co-realised with that ship also
burns. More generally, this concept of direct participation can be attributed to a particular
argument place within an expression describing a dynamic property. This is enforced by
constraints of the form:
(C4) (Occurs(v(α), δ)∧ (∀t)[(b(δ) t  e(δ))
→ Holds-at(α = β, t)])→Occurs(v(β), δ).
9. Relation to other AI theories
We now look at how two established AI theories of events can be described within VEL.
It is worth noting that, despite the expressiveness of VEL, we encountered considerable
difficulty in arriving at reasonable formulations. Because AI theories are oriented towards
achieving certain reasoning tasks, they employ abstractions of the structure of time and
events that are geared to achieving a compromise between expressivity and computational
tractability. But how to spell out the nature of these abstractions relative to the very general
model structures provided by VEL is not always obvious.
9.1. Situation Calculus
The Situation Calculus [35] is a very well-known and influential representation for
actions. The basic idea of this system is to use a language which contains, in addition
to propositional expressions (fluents), variables over a domain of situations. Fluents are
related to situations by the special relation Holds(ϕ, s). Action types are then modelled
as functions from situations to situations. More specifically, if a is an action type, then
result(a, s) is a term denoting the situation which occurs immediately after action a is
performed in situation s.
Let us look at how the Situation Calculus could be interpreted within VEL. Our
formalism already has situation variables and McCarthy’s Holds predicate corresponds
very closely to our Holds-in predicate. The only problem is the result function. The
Situation Calculus is based on an assumption that when an action is performed in a given
state then a unique state will result; but within our model of states and events there may
be many different situations which could be the result of a given action because any given
event-type can occur in various different ways.
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We have the option of simply introducing sit-calc-actions into VEL as functions
from states to states (possibly with additional parameters). We could then reconstruct
Situation Calculus faithfully within VEL. However, this leaves completely unconstrained
the relationship between sit-calc-actions and the verbs, event-types and event-tokens
already provided by VEL. But we ought to have some strong connection between sit-calc-
actions and event-types.
A drastic solution is to force all VEL events to have a unique result state by adding a
further axiom:
(A40) 〈e〉AS(s)→[e]AS(s).
We could then identify sit-calc-actions directly with event-types. However, this would
severely restrict the generality of our framework. In particular it would mean that we could
no longer define event-types in terms of arbitrary conditions on the time intervals over
which they occur.
A similar but more subtle approach is to treat Situation Calculus actions as a special sub-
type of VEL events for which (A40) holds. Thus rather than adopting (A40) as a general
axiom, we would have a specific constraining formula 〈scai〉AS(s)→[scai]AS(s) for each
sit-calc-action scai . So, only the sit-calc-actions would be constrained to correspond to
deterministic events.
At first consideration it may seem that, within the branching time structure of VEL, it
would make little sense to simply deem certain event-types to be deterministic. However,
since event-types are semantically identified with classes of episodes, any event-type must
have at least one deterministic sub-type. Moreover, many modes of reasoning in terms of
arbitrary event-types can be shown to be reducible to equivalent forms of reasoning with
deterministic event-types. For instance, whenever there is a consecutive series of intervals
δ1, . . . , δn, satisfying a sequence of event types e1, . . . , en, the same series of intervals
must satisfy a sequence of deterministic event-types e′1, . . . , e′n, such that each e′i ⊆ ei . So,
to find whether a given goal can be achieved by a series of events, we need only consider
whether it can be achieved by a series of deterministic events. Also, effect axioms for
non-deterministic event-types, which constrain the states of all their possible outcomes,
will clearly apply equally to any deterministic sub-types of those events. Thus, confining
attention to deterministic events can often be a very useful simplifying abstraction of the
space of possible event sequences. This is perhaps a reason for the power of the Situation
Calculus ontology. However, we believe that allowing non-deterministic events provides
for much more flexible modelling of parallel event sequences, especially where we do not
wish to impose any fixed synchronisation between parallel events.
Another approach to representing the Situation Calculus, which may also be more
appropriate in some cases, is to recast the function result as a kind of quantifier over
possible resulting states. Thus rather than writing Φ(result(e)) (where Φ(. . .) is any
VEL predicate that can take a state variable as argument) we would use the form
(result e, s)[Φ(s)], where (result e, s)[Φ(s)] ≡def (∀s′)[(e : s ⇒ s′)→ Φ(s′)]. By using
this transform, axioms which make sense under a deterministic model of action, can
be transformed into analogous axioms which hold in a branching model that allows an
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occurrence of a given event-type occurring in a given state to lead to multiple possible
outcome states.
9.2. Event calculus
Another formalism that has been used for describing and reasoning about actions and
events is the Event Calculus [32]. An account of this calculus and its variants can be found
in [44]. At the heart of the Event Calculus is a principle of inertia: if an event causes
some ‘fluent’ (i.e., proposition) to hold, then it will continue to hold until some later event
causes it to become false. This idea can be formalised by the following basic axioms of
Event Calculus:28
(EC1) Holds-at(ϕ, t2)←
Happens(ε, t1)∧ Initiates(ε,ϕ, t1)∧ (t1 < t2)∧¬Clipped(t1, ϕ, t2).
(EC2) Clipped(t1, ϕ, t2)← Happens(ε, t)∧ (t1 < t < t2)∧ Terminates(ε,ϕ, t).
The predicate Clipped is introduced primarily to achieve a Horn clause formulation. Since
it is not normally employed except within these two axioms (whereas the other predicates
will also occur in scenario descriptions) it can be eliminated to give an equivalent single
axiom:
(EC) Holds-at(ϕ, t2)← Happens(ε, t1)∧ Initiates(ε,ϕ, t1)∧ (t1 < t2)∧
¬∃ε′[Happens(ε′, t)∧ (t1 < t < t2)∧ Terminates(ε′, ϕ, t)].
Here we formulate the axiom as applying to event-tokens, although later versions of the
Event Calculus often work in terms of event types. Direct representation of the analogous
event-type axiom would not be possible in VEL because we do not allow quantification
over event-types.29 Nevertheless, although inertia is specified in terms of tokens, one
can still express conditions on the Initiates and Terminates predicates in terms of event-
types, and these conditions would be inherited by the tokens of these types. Thus we can
equally well emulate Event Calculus style reasoning, in which a causal theory is formulated
either in terms of event-types or tokens (or both if we wish). Moreover, at the end of this
section we shall give an encoding of Event Calculus in terms of event-types, where we use
schematic event-type variables instead of quantification.
Let us now define VEL analogues of the Event Calculus predicates. Holds-at can be
represented directly by the VEL predicate of the same name. With the other predicates we
meet a small problem, because the events of Event Calculus are normally taken as being
punctual (happening at a single point in time), whereas VEL events can occur either over
punctual or extended intervals. To account for this we could restrict the axiom to apply
only to punctual events. However, a more general approach seems to be available. The
Event Calculus reasons about cause and effect in terms of which fluents are made to hold
28 These are the axioms given for the ‘Simplified Event Calculus’ of Shanahan [44, p. 252].
29 Of course we could add event-type quantification, but this would have a second-order character, which we
would like to avoid.
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or cease to hold immediately after an event. Hence, it is the end point of the event that
is relevant to this kind of reasoning. So in our VEL encoding we shall define Happens,
Initiates and Terminates by reference to the end points of the events involved:
(D35) Happens(ε, τ ) ≡def (τ = e(dur(ε))).
(D36) Initiates(ε,ϕ, τ ) ≡def (τ = e(dur(ε))∧Holds-at(ϕ, τ)).
(D37) Terminates(ε,ϕ, τ ) ≡def Initiates(ε,¬ϕ, τ).
In order to specify what happens and the effects of initiation and termination in terms of
event-types we could use the following defined predicates:
(D38) Happens∗(e, τ ) ≡def ∃δ[Occurs(e, δ)∧ e(δ)= τ ].
(D39) Initiates∗(e, ϕ) ≡def (〈∀e, ε〉[∀t[(e(dur(ε))= t)→ Initiates(ε,ϕ, t)]]).
(D40) Terminates∗(e, ϕ) ≡def Initiates∗(e,¬ϕ).
Since event-token quantification in VEL is always relative to an event-type we will also
need a further definition to enable us to quantify over a type of generic event that occurs
over every arbitrary interval. Thus we define:30
(D41) any-event ≡def 〈δ : δ = δ〉.
Using our definitions EC can now be represented in VEL by the formula:
(VEL-EC) 〈∀any-event, ε〉[(Happens(ε, t1)∧ Initiates(ε,ϕ, t1)∧¬〈∃any-event, ε′〉
(∃t)[Happens(ε′, t)∧ (t1 < t < t2)∧Terminates(ε′, ϕ, t)])→ Holds-at(ϕ, t2)].
What is the status of this formula? Since it represents the basis of Event Calculus reasoning
one might hope that it is valid within VEL. But as it stands it is not. The problem is that
VEL allows the following counter-example to VEL-EC: ϕ might be initiated by some event
at t1 and remain true for all times t such that (t1 < t < t2) but then ϕ could still become
false at t2.
The reason why (t1 < t < t2) works for the Event Calculus is that it treats fluents as
holding over intervals that are open at their beginning and closed at their end.31 We shall
call such an interval a BOEC interval; and a proposition that only holds over such intervals
30 Note that tokens of any-event will be distinct form tokens of any more specific type, so in quantifying
over any-event tokens we are not quantifying over arbitrary event-tokens. But, since our definitions of Happens,
Initiates and Terminates only refer to the end times of event-tokens and the changes in proposition that occur after
these times, whenever an event of a more specific type happens and initiates or terminates a proposition there will
also be a token of any-event that happens at the same time and initiates/terminates the same proposition. Hence,
cause and effect rules specified for tokens of more specific event-types will be mirrored by the occurrences of
tokens of the generic any-event event-type.
31 To be more precise, this requirement only applies to those fluents that are initiated or terminated. It is these
inertial fluents that are forced by the axioms to maintain a persistent truth value between initiating and terminating
events. A dual interpretation, where the duration of inertial fluents is closed at the beginning and open at the end,
is also possible.
B. Bennett, A.P. Galton / Artificial Intelligence 153 (2004) 13–48 45
will be called a BOEC proposition. When an event ε changes a proposition ϕ from true to
false, ϕ is taken as remaining true up to the time at which the event ‘Happen’s and then
becoming false for some BOEC interval immediately following the time of the event.
From an ontological viewpoint, the condition that propositions should be BOEC seems
to us unnatural. In our view, whether a proposition holds over an open or a closed interval
is not an arbitrary modelling decision, but is determined by the meaning of the proposition.
For instance a state of ‘connectedness’ between two objects that can move continuously
in space can hold only over closed intervals, because the distance dt (a, b) between objects
a and b at time t must be a continuous function of time. Thus any interval over which
dt (a, b)= 0 must be closed. Similarly, ‘disconnectedness’ between a and b occurs over
intervals where dt (a, b) > 0, and these must be open.
Nevertheless, if one is interested in implementing practical reasoning algorithms, we
accept that there may be good reasons to describe the world using BOEC propositions. In
many cases one can get round the limitations of the BOEC requirement by adjusting the
meanings of non-BOEC propositions to get a closely related BOEC version. For example,
one can use a modified version of ‘connectedness’, C(x, y), which is true at a time
point t just in case x and y were connected throughout some open interval immediately
preceding t (i.e., C(x, y) ≡def C(x, y)). There would still be a problem representing
propositions that hold for an isolated instant (e.g., a thrown ball being at the apex of its
trajectory). However, in richer versions of the Event Calculus, which have been developed
to take account of continuously varying fluents, additional apparatus is used which can
represent propositions that are true at instants or over closed intervals (e.g., by the use of a
‘Trajectory’ predicate as proposed in [43] and further developed in [44,45]).
In VEL we can easily define a propositional operator ‘BOEC’, such that BOEC(ϕ) is
true just in case ϕ is BOEC:32
(D42) BOEC(ϕ) ≡def ((ϕ→ϕ)∧ (¬ϕ→¬ϕ)).
We can now take the basis of Event Calculus reasoning as being represented by the VEL
axiom (BOEC(ϕ)→ VEL-EC), which can be shown to be valid according to the VEL
semantics.
An alternative approach to representing Event Calculus within VEL would be to
weaken VEL-EC by replacing (t1 < t < t2) by (t1 < t  t2). This would mean that some
modification would be required in the reasoning mechanisms that are usually applied to
compute inferences in Event Calculus, but we see no reason why this should not be feasible.
The two alternatives correspond to the following slight modifications of VEL-EC, each
of which is valid in VEL:
(VEL-EC1) BOEC(ϕ)→〈∀any-event, ε〉[(Happens(ε, t1)∧ Initiates(ε,ϕ, t1)∧
¬〈∃any-event, ε′〉(∃t)[Happens(ε′, t)∧ (t1 < t < t2)∧
Terminates(ε′, ϕ, t)])→ Holds-at(ϕ, t2)].
32 This definition also implies that ϕ cannot undergo the pathological intermingling behaviour that was
considered in Section 2.8. Thus, where we restrict to BOEC propositions, we do not need to enforce axioms
(A19) and (A20).
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(VEL-EC2) 〈∀any-event, ε〉[(Happens(ε, t1)∧ Initiates(ε,ϕ, t1)∧
¬〈∃any-event, ε′〉(∃t)[Happens(ε′, t)∧ (t1 < t  t2)∧
Terminates(ε′, ϕ, t)])→ Holds-at(ϕ, t2)].
We conclude this section by showing how each of VEL-EC1 and VEL-EC2 can be
transformed back into a Horn clause formulation which is very close to published formats
of the Event Calculus (e.g., [45]).
First we shall define Clipped< and Clipped as follows:
(D43) Clipped<(t1, ϕ, t2) ≡def
〈∃any-event, ε〉[Happens(ε, t)∧ (t1 < t < t2)∧ Terminates(ε,ϕ, t)].
(D44) Clipped(t1, ϕ, t2) ≡def
〈∃any-event, ε〉[Happens(ε, t)∧ (t1 < t  t2)∧ Terminates(ε,ϕ, t)].
From this it is easy to show that the following schematic Horn formulae are valid, where e
stands for any event-type:
(Cl1) Clipped<(t1, ϕ, t2)← Happens∗(e, t)∧ (t1 < t < t2)∧ Terminates∗(e, ϕ, t).
(Cl2) Clipped(t1, ϕ, t2)← Happens∗(e, t)∧ (t1 < t  t2)∧ Terminates∗(e, ϕ, t).
If we substitute Clipped< and Clipped respectively into VEL-EC1 and VEL-EC2, from
the resulting formulae we can prove the following Horn schemas:
(VEL-EC-HS1) Holds-at(ϕ, t2) ← BOEC(ϕ) ∧ Happens∗(e, t1) ∧ Initiates∗(e, ϕ, t1) ∧
¬Clipped<(t1, ϕ, t2).
(VEL-EC-HS2) Holds-at(ϕ, t2)← Happens∗(e, t1)∧ Initiates∗(e, ϕ, t1)∧
¬Clipped(t1, ϕ, t2).
We could use either VEL-EC-HS1 with Cl1 or VEL-EC-HS2 with Cl2 as the basis of an
inference procedure, which would work in much the same way as existing Event Calcu-
lus implementations (e.g., SLD resolution with negation as failure). This means that an
Event Calculus inference engine could be used as a reasoning module for VEL. Of course
it would be limited to computing inferences from sets of VEL formulae that are expressed
in form analogous to an Event Calculus theory. Also, if negation as failure is used to re-
solve the negated Clipped literals, one would be importing an additional non-monotonic
inference rule into the VEL logic.
10. Conclusion
We have given a precise formal semantics for a very expressive temporal language
(VEL), which is capable of describing events in a variety of different ways. In particular it
incorporates within a single system several of the most influential approaches to represent-
ing time and events. The framework provides a general temporal ontology within which
more practically oriented representations can be interpreted. It also supports the design of
modular reasoning systems combining decision procedures for tractable sublanguages of
VEL.
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In further work we hope to establish a complete axiom system for VEL and to relate
our system to formalisms such as CTL∗ [13], whose computational properties are better
understood [14]. We would also like to explore how VEL might take account of issues such
as the frame problem and how it relates to non-monotonic formalisms that deal with this.
We plan to extend VEL to incorporate the representation of space and matter.
Preliminary work on describing physical processes [5,6] suggests that VEL is well suited
to this purpose. It would also be useful to establish the relationship of the VEL semantics
to ontologies based on four-dimensional spatio-temporal regions [28,30].
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